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Schaengold: Comment--Jurisdiction in Virtual Worlds

PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER OFFENSES COMMITTED IN
VIRTUAL WORLDS
Zachary Schaengold*

I. INTRODUCTION
In 1993, writer Julian Dibbell chronicled a trip into the virtual world
called LambdaMOO, where he was witness to what would later be
called “A Rape in Cyberspace.”1 Into the living room of a virtual
mansion, where users congregated to chat and mingle, a user named Mr.
Bungle entered.2 The user, sitting in front of a keyboard, could only see
text move slowly across the screen as interactions unfolded,3 but each
user could write what their representation (known to others in the room
by their screen names) in this virtual house would do and say.4 Mr.
Bungle entered the room with a subprogram that permitted him to take
control of the “actions” of the other representations in the room, and
used this to inflict sexual and violent acts on and with them.5 The result,
on those in the room typing in their representations’ actions and words
and watching the others, was emotionally traumatizing.6
While rape or physical assault in a virtual world will not meet the
requisite elements for such causes of action in U.S. federal or state
court, it is not inconceivable that one of the users whose representation
was sexually assaulted would bring charges against Mr. Bungle’s user
under a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, or some
other trauma-based action.7 Assuming this claim were actionable, in
which court would the plaintiff be able to bring the claim?
Rape and emotional assault are not the only crimes in a virtual world
that might be actionable in the non-virtual world. Contract disputes,
defamation, and maybe even property rights could all lead to virtual
world injuries requiring non-virtual world court decisions.8
When someone signs into a virtual world like Second Life, they enter

* Associate Member, 2011–12; Articles Editor, 2012–13 University of Cincinnati Law Review.
1. Julian Dibbell, A Rape in Cyberspace, JULIAN DIBBELL (DOT COM),
http://www.juliandibbell.com/articles/a-rape-in- cyberspace/.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See BENJAMIN TYSON DURANSKE, VIRTUAL LAW 180 (2008).
8. See generally Susan W. Brenner, Fantasy Crime: The Role of Criminal Law in Virtual
Worlds, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1 (2008).
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into a virtual world.9 This world, connected by the internet, does not
recognize geopolitical boundaries.10 The internet itself breaks these
boundaries, but in many cases sites are still bound to where their users
are—by language, time of activity, ISP, or even domain name.11 When
one goes onto the internet, one directs activities to sites that are
presumptively directly connected with some geographic place.
However, entering a virtual world does not create the same presumption,
especially a virtual world designed to replace one’s real-world existence.
The result is that every action is directed into the virtual world, but not
at any forum outside the virtual world.12 There is no expectation of
being bound by the laws of a given state, except perhaps one’s own;13 if
there are any laws that the user of a virtual world assumes will bind her,
it is the specific set of laws found in the virtual world.14
This Comment proposes an approach to personal jurisdiction in cases
arising out of virtual world injuries. In doing so, it proposes that (a)
virtual worlds are disjointed from the non-virtual world and so require
discussion beyond application of prior internet personal jurisdiction law,
such as Zippo,15 (b) this approach to personal jurisdiction for virtual
worlds should correspond with existing personal jurisdiction law and not
consider internet exceptionalism as a methodology, (c) in order to
determine non-virtual world personal jurisdiction for injuries in the
virtual worlds, the best approach to the separable unity of User/Avatar is
to analogize it to a sole proprietorship, and (d) the non-exceptionalist
approach to personal jurisdiction should be augmented by Terms of
Service (TOS).
II. THE INTERNET AND VIRTUAL WORLDS
A. The Internet
Eric Goldman16 describes the evolution of the law and the internet in

9. See infra Part II(C).
10. Am. Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 165 (1997).
11. See, e.g., id. at 167.
12. See, e.g., Chris Reed, Why Must You Be Mean to Me?, 13 NEW CRIM. L. REV 485, 487–88
(2010).
13. See Chris Reed, The Authority of Law in Cyberspace, 1 (Draft Discussion Oct. 13, 2010),
available at http://profchrisreed.blogspot.com/2010/10/authority-of-law-in-cyberspace.html.
14. Id.
15. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (proposing a sliding
scale of interactivity of the website to help determine jurisdiction). For why this test is unsatisfactory,
see generally Kristin Woeste, General Jurisdiction and the Internet: Sliding Too Far?, 73 U. CIN. L.
REV. 793 (2004).
16. Eric Goldman is the Associate Professor at Santa Clara University School of Law and
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three phases.17 The first was utopianism, for which Goldman gives as
an example 47 U.S.C. § 230, which favors online publishers over offline
publishers in their liability for third party content, even if the content
published is identical.18
The second phase was a turnabout into paranoia, in which regulators
started to fear the internet, and produced stricter rules for internet
activities than for the offline equivalents.19
The most recent trend, Goldman states, is specific regulation for the
internet—or, as he calls it, exceptionalism. He notes that the
development of blogs and virtual worlds (including Facebook) have led
to a sort of specific exceptionalism: not just treating the internet as
unique in its need for regulation, but even with that, treating certain
activities on the internet as needing their own specific regulation.20
His take on this is that in some cases this regulation may be
necessary, but “before enacting exceptionalist Internet regulation,
regulators should articulate how the Internet is special or different and
explain why these differences support exceptionalism.”21
One of the more salient problems is connected to the source of the
laws establishing borders. In addition to newer exceptionalist ideas,
some propose that cyberspace “needs and can create its own law and
legal institutions.”22 On the far other end is the argument that
“[c]yberspace transactions are no different from ‘real-space’
transnational transactions . . . . There is no general normative argument
that supports the immunization of cyberspace activities from territorial
regulation.”23
These extremes indicate the debates being carried out in scholarship.
In the absence of strict governmental or ISP regulation, does this mean
that “[b]y venturing into cyberspace, a person steps outside the sphere of
his home country’s jurisdiction and potentially subjects himself to the
laws of all the countries in the world”?24 In People v. World Interactive
director
of
the
school’s
High
Tech
Law
Institute.
ERIC
GOLDMAN,
http://www.ericgoldman.org/biography.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2012).
17. Eric Goldman, The Third Wave of Internet Exceptionalism, INFORMIT (July 15, 2012),
http://www.informit.com/articles/article.aspx?p=1325266.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Marketa Trimble, The Future of Cybertravel: Legal Implications and the Evasion of
Geolocation, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. (forthcoming 2012) (citing David R.
Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders - The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367
(1996)). Id. at 16 n.54.
23. Id. at n.55 (citing Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and The Dormant
Commerce Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 827 (2001)).
24. Chris Reed, The Authority of Law in Cyberspace, 1 (Draft Discussion Oct. 13, 2010),
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Gaming Corp.,25 the Supreme Court of New York held that internet
transactions, personal and commercial “shed their novelty for
jurisdictional purposes [in] that similar to their traditional counterparts,
they are all executed by and between individuals or corporate entities
which are subject to a court’s jurisdiction.”26 However, a hypothetical
Chinese woman doing business through a Hong Kong ISP, selling
website maintenance from a website setup in South Africa to primarily
South Americans, could give pains to this 1999 New York case—even
more so if everything is being done in a virtual world whose servers and
operators are in California. And what if there is no “transaction,” but
simply communication and community, as part of a full projection of an
alternate self into a virtual world?
Because the internet, and the perceptions of the internet, have
changed so much in even a relatively short time, “[i]t is clear that the set
of legal rules which is applicable to a cyberspace actor was not designed
as a coherent set of rules. Rather, it is an emergent phenomenon
resulting from individual normative directives produced, in the main, at
the national level.”27 Thus, a cyberspace actor will not enter into
cyberspace with a transferred system of laws attached to her interactions
in cyberspace, and any laws she recognizes will be specific to the
cyberspace environment.28 Chris Reed29 argues that a rule of law should
apply to cyberspace30 and that the laws should be set up “rationally
rather than capriciously”31 based upon the idea that cyberspace actors
will conduct themselves according to a recognized community standard
(the cyber-community) and will conform accordingly.32 His motivation
for this is that “[t]he internet has pervaded our lives to such an extent
that it is fast becoming as important to us as our physical transport
infrastructure. Lawless driving reduces the utility of the roads, and for
the same sorts of reasons we have the right to demand lawful behaviour
in cyberspace.”33 Recognizing, however, the possible perceived
disjunction of real and virtual worlds, he encourages states to “offer
cyberspace actors the same respect that they demand from them” when

available at http://profchrisreed.blogspot.com/2010/10/authority-of-law-in-cyberspace.html.
25. 714 N.Y.S.2d 844 (N.Y. 1999).
26. Id. at 848–49.
27. Reed, supra note 24, at 3.
28. Id. at 1.
29. Chris Reed is a professor of Electronic Commerce Law in the Centre for Commercial Law
Studies at Queen Mary University of London. Id.
30. Id. at 15.
31. Id. at 7.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 17.
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creating these laws.34
All this is to say that, while a set of legal rules applicable to the
internet, whether the same is applied to the offline world or not, is yet to
be established—and this is in part because we have not yet figured out
how we view the internet—what is important is that the rules be
coherent, only exceptional when necessary and reasonable, and
generally known and accepted by the online actors.
B. Virtual Worlds
Virtual worlds gained prominence in the early twenty-first century
with the publication of studies of virtual property by Edward
Castronova.35 In his working paper, “Virtual Worlds: A First-Hand
Account of Market and Society on the Cyberian Frontier,” Castronova
wrote, “[a]t a time when many e-commerce concerns are going under,
revenues from online gaming will grow to over $1.5 billion in 2004.
Some 60,000 people visit Norrath in any given hour . . . . The exchange
rate . . . value exceeds that of the Japanese Yen and the Italian Lira.”36
The virtual world of Norrath37 in the online game Everquest, supported
by five servers in California, had a GNP per capita that would have
placed it as the seventy-seventh wealthiest country in the world.38 In
addition, Castronova reports that “[s]ome 20 percent of Norrath’s
citizens consider it their place of residence; they just commute to Earth
and back. To a large and growing number of people, virtual worlds are
an important source of material and emotional well-being.”39
The law’s relationship with virtual worlds is best developed in a
context that takes into account what happens in the “real reality (not the
virtual reality) of these games.”40 As Rónán Kennedy writes,41 “[i]t
would be tempting to write virtual worlds off as a type of game or a
more sophisticated virtual reality system. In fact, these games are part
of everyday life for many people worldwide and will become
increasingly important as a communications tool and as a method of

34. Id. at 18.
35. Kristina Denapolis, Real Concerns in Virtual Property 4 (July 1, 2005) (unpublished
manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1154234.
36. Edward Castronova, Virtual Worlds: A First-Hand Account of Market and Society on the
Cyberian Frontier 3 (CESifo, Working Paper No. 618, Dec. 2001).
37. Id.
38. Depapolis, supra note 35, at 5.
39. Castonova, supra note 36, at 3.
40. Rónán Kennedy, Law in Virtual Worlds, 12 No. 10 J. INTERNET L. 3, 1 (2009).
41. Rónán Kennedy is the co-ordinator of the L.L.M program in Law, Technology, and
Governance at NIU Galway. ACADEMIA.EDU, http://nuigalway.academia.edu/RónánKennedy (last
visited Oct. 17, 2012).
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commerce.”42 For Kennedy, the virtual worlds are not so much games
as they are “significant platforms for human activity and business, with
real money being exchanged for virtual goods and services.”43 But for
many, virtual worlds are more than just newer economic zones.
C. Second Life
Second Life is perhaps the best known of the virtual worlds, boasting
fifteen million users in 2010,44 and so will be used as the primary
example in this Comment. Included among those real-world entities
with a presence in Second Life are hundreds of higher education
institutes, the Smithsonian, NASA, the Holocaust Museum, Nike,
Microsoft, CNN, BBC, and the City of Ontario.45 Classes are
sometimes held—and created—in Second Life,46 and it has been used as
a method of therapy for both congenital diseases and victims of abuse.47
The 2004 and 2008 U.S. presidential elections were felt in Second Life,
and President Barack Obama has invested millions of U.S. dollars48 in
green project development in Second Life.49
The Linden dollar has a variable exchange rate with real-world
monies, and fluctuates according to market supply and demand.50
Second Life’s recognition of user ownership of assets51 has led to a real
market existing in Second Life. Many Second Life users earn a few
hundred dollars per month, but some have reported significant success.
For example, one sale of Second Life real estate purportedly sold for
fifty thousand U.S. dollars.52 Enough users have created a large enough
economy that $125 million in transactions was reported for the first
quarter of 2009.53
There is no homogenous culture in Second Life; users range from sex
escort entrepreneurs to humanists to original Second Life users passing
down knowledge to new arrivals. There are people who exist in Second
42. Kennedy, supra note 40, at 1.
43. Id. at 2.
44. Simon Gottschalk, The Presentation of Avatars in Second Life: Self and Interaction in Social
Virtual Spaces, 33 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 501, 502 (2010).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 502–03.
47. Id. at 503.
48. Obama invested three billion “Linden” dollars. Id.
49. Id.
50. Stephen J. Davidson, An Immersive Perspective on the Second Life Virtual World, 947
PRACTICING L. INST. 673, 680 (2007).
51. SECOND LIFE TERMS OF SERVICE, http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php at 7.1 (last visited
Oct. 17, 2012).
52. Davidson, supra note 50, at 681.
53. Gottschalk, supra note 44, at 503.
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Life simply to prey on others, some are there to learn as students or
ethnographic researchers, and some enter as virtual tourists, with either
Second Life itself, or the sights in Second Life as their destination.54
There are churches, synagogues, and mosques,55 and a memorial to the
2007 Virginia Tech shooting.56
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN USER AND AVATAR
A. Being in Second Life and Other Virtual Worlds
The interactions between users, through their avatars, in Second Life
and other virtual worlds are unlike any other form of interaction on the
internet. It is not communicating through emails or chat programs. It is
not fundamentally buying and selling. Nor is it similar to taking part in
a large discussion on varied or specific topics, such as on blogs or in
chat rooms. The closest analogue to non-virtual life to what people do
in Second Life is actual living; working, communicating, building
communities, emotionally bonding, and learning are the beginnings of
an inexhaustible list of what people do in the non-virtual world, and
what user/avatars do in the virtual world.
Second Life alone has spawned a large number of research papers in a
variety of fields, many looking at the relationship between user and
avatar, and between the virtual world and non-virtual world. Some have
even argued that the end of the non-virtual world is soon to come as the
avatar and the virtual world become of greater reality to the user in the
non-virtual world.57 On the other hand, anthropologist Alex Golub
recognizes that a virtual world cannot be considered equal to the nonvirtual world if for only the different results in the death of the avatar
and the death of the user.58 So then, how do people cope with this and
correspondingly prioritize their virtual lives? Golub argues that “[t]he
hierarchicalization of worlds . . . is here imposed amongst virtual spaces,
which results in a focus of the true ‘placeness’ of Second Life at the
expense of other locations where Second Lifers might congregate.”59
Put simply, in spite of this seemingly mortal flaw, everybody in Second

54. Davidson, supra note 50, at 682–83.
55. Id. at 683.
56. Id. at 684.
57. Alex Golub, Being in the World (of Warcraft): Raiding, Realism, and Knowledge
Production in a Massively Multiplayer Online Game, 83 ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q. 17 (2010) (citing
EDWARD CASTRONOVA, EXODUS TO THE VIRTUAL WORLD: HOW ONLINE FUN IS CHANGING REALITY
xiv–xv (Palgrave Macmillan 2007).
58. Id.
59. Id.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2013

7

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 10

368

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81

Life recognizes that Second Life is a uniquely shared place among all of
them, and so it is given the most value as a “place,” to the detriment of
other places, such as the offline world.
This is perhaps most accurate for those who feel that they are more
residents of Second Life than of the offline world. User/avatar
relationships with virtual worlds run the gamut. There are those who
feel as if they live in the virtual world more than the offline world,60
those who use the virtual world for teaching61 or therapy,62 and those
whose relationship is bound up in bridging the two worlds—a position
that implicitly posits a distinct and separable virtual world.
One distinguishing aspect of Second Life and similar virtual worlds is
that there are no “established and universal game objectives.”63 The
users have no mission or goal in Second Life—just creativity and
interaction.64 As such, the residents “become creators of this world (and
themselves in it) rather than its subjects.”65
Thus, it is evident that even when virtual worlds are construed as
being connected to the real world, as opposed to being separate and
sovereign kingdoms,66 the interaction in and with the virtual worlds is
not the same as one has with other websites geared towards basic
communication, such as email and chat programs, information wiki’s,
blogs, .edu’s, personal pages, or with commercialized sites, such as
Amazon.com, eBay.com, and corporate webpages. The interaction with
virtual worlds is closer to mimicking, replacing, or extending real life.
relationships, personalities, desires (cupidinous and otherwise),
responsibilities, and cause-and-effect interactions are all developed in
Second Life. While Second Life cannot be said to exist independently
of real life (after all, the servers are in a real-world state, as are the
people keeping the project going), the claim that virtual worlds exist,
slightly disjoint and separable from the real world, is colorable.
B. The Relationship Between Avatar and User
If we are to accept the concept of a separable virtual world, we must
60. Castronova, supra note 36, at 3.
61. Molly W. Berger, Manon of Second Life: Teaching in the Virtual World, 49 TECH. AND
CULTURE 430 (2008).
62. Giuseppe Riva et al., Interreality in Practice: Bridging Virtual and Real Worlds in the
Treatment of Posttraumatic Stress Disorders, 13 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAV. 1 (2010).
63. Thomas M. Malaby, The Second Life of Institutions: Social Poetics in a Digital State, 83
ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q. 355, 358 (2010).
64. Gottschalk, supra note 44, at 504.
65. Id.
66. John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace (Feb. 8, 1996),
https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html.
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define the relationship between the user and the avatar. This is
problematic, and many commentators take the approach that the avatar
is at most property, likely intellectual property.67
This latter
interpretation gains support from the End-User License Agreement
(EULA) or TOS of Second Life, which gives the user full intellectual
property rights over whatever she creates in Second Life.68 While the
avatar can be modified, it must be noted that it comes into existence
when the user enters the game, and so cannot be considered at this
incipient stage to be the intellectual property of the user. It might be
argued that Second Life, or another virtual platform, owns the newlyformed avatar, and in this case one could make a principal–agent
analogy. It could also be argued that the avatar and user are separate
forms of the same entity, one in the virtual world and one in the real
world. These two possibilities will be developed below, but first a few
more possible analogies to the relationship must be discounted.
If the separability of the virtual and real world is assumed, it cannot
be argued that the user and avatar are identical. The interactions the
avatar has with other avatars in its path through the virtual world and the
traces it leaves of itself (in communication, construction, and as part of
the background) in the virtual world are not what the real person leaves
in either the real world or the virtual world. Nor can the avatar be the
façade on communication—a visual pen name—for the same reasons.
The influence and impact the avatar has in the virtual world is not the
same as the influence and impact the user has in the real world. In fact,
it would be impossible, as the user does not even have access to the
virtual world except through an avatar.
If the avatar, as a distinct entity, is owned by the virtual platform
provider, which gives total control to the user, then it is possible that this
relationship can be analogized to that of a principal-agent. The Third
Restatement of Agency defines agency as “the fiduciary relationship
that arises when one person (a principal) manifests assent to another
person (an agent) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and
subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or
otherwise consents so to act.”69 It should be noted that this Comment
does not claim that the relationship is actually that of principal-agent;
only that the relationship might be considered analogous. There are
obvious problems with an exact comparison. For example, if the
platform provides an avatar that is considered an agent, what sort of
relationship is then formed between the platform and the “principal”?
67. See generally Joshua A. T. Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B.U. L. REV 1047 (2005).
68. SECOND LIFE TERMS OF SERVICE, http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php at 7.1 (last visited
Oct. 17, 2012).
69. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY: AGENCY DEFINED § 1.01 (2011).
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Within the scope of what is expected of the avatar-agent in acting for the
principal-user (which is effectively everything in the virtual world), the
agent will act with some sort of authority, be it actual, apparent, or
implied. Therefore, the principal user will be liable for actions
committed by the agent avatar.70 This would result in real-world
liability for virtual world injuries, and as this Comment has not claimed
the absolute disjointedness of the two worlds, the relationship might still
stand. However, the assent or consent requirement on the part of the
agent makes this an impractical analogy.
Another way of viewing the avatar-user relationship is by analogy to
a sole proprietorship. The user would be analogous to the person, and
the avatar to the business. This is the default, “natural” business form71
and combines a business and a person into one,72 even if the person
views the business as separate from herself or her personal identity. In
addition, the person retains full liability for injuries caused by the
business.73 And while, depending if the jurisdiction considers the avatar
the property of the user, the avatar might be inherited like a sole
proprietorship, the avatar would likely cease to exist, just like the
business.74
The world of commerce can be analogized to the virtual world by
viewing them both as human-constructed worlds with specific rules,
boundaries, and assumptions that separate them from the nonbusiness
virtual world. The sole proprietorship creates a bridge between the
business and nonbusiness world, with the business aspect of the sole
proprietor acting and interacting within the rule set and boundaries of
the business world, and the nonbusiness aspect inhabiting the
nonbusiness world. Similarly, the avatar is the form the user/avatar
connection uses to act in the virtual world, with its rule set and
boundaries, and the user is the form that inhabits the non-virtual world.
While this separation does not take place from a legal standpoint, very
often for both the business owner and the user the distinction of which
world they are operating in is evident. In both cases, the nonconstructed-world inhabitant is liable for the acts and omissions of the
constructed-world actor. The two (avatar/user and the business/sole
proprietor) are fundamentally one, but appear as separate (to themselves
and to those with whom they interact) in different worlds, for which the

70. See id. §§ 2.01–03.
71. Doing Business in the United States, in DOING BUSINESS IN THE UNITED STATES § 7.02
(2010). This is the default form for one person doing business. The presumption is that one person or
real-world entity is related to one avatar.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss1/10

10

Schaengold: Comment--Jurisdiction in Virtual Worlds

2012]

COMMENT—JURISDICTION IN VIRTUAL WORLDS

371

avatar and business personnel are specifically designed.
This relationship serves as a model by which the offline entity is
subject to any jurisdiction where it would normally be subject, yet still
retains a presence in the virtual world.
An individual would
automatically be subject to jurisdiction for virtually-committed acts
wherever the individual resides, and wherever else the individual is
subject to personal jurisdiction.
A corporate entity subject to
jurisdiction in all fifty states would be subject to jurisdiction for
virtually-committed acts in all fifty states. Each would also be subject
to jurisdiction where mandated by the TOS of the virtual world
provider.75
IV. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
A. A Brief History of Personal Jurisdiction
The United States Supreme Court broke from the historic Pennoyer v.
Neff76 determination of personal jurisdiction in International Shoe v.
Washington,77 when it stated that, as a corporate personality was itself a
fiction, the idea of presence within a forum state for purposes of taxation
or responding to legal suits must correlate with a certain degree of
activity engaged in by those acting on the corporation’s behalf within
the forum state.78 For the purposes of personal jurisdiction, due process
required that for a defendant to be subject to suit in a forum, she have
“certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance
of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.’”79
The Court continued to develop the nuances of this ruling in WorldWide Volkswagen v. Woodson, discussing the tension between the need
to “remain faithful to the principles of interstate federalism embedded
within the Constitution,”80 and the recognition that “[a]s technological
progress has increased the flow of commerce between the States, the
need for jurisdiction over nonresidents has undergone a similar
increase.”81 The result in this case was that if the contacts with a forum
are such that a defendant can reasonably anticipate being haled into

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

See infra Part II(C).
95 U.S. 714 (1878).
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
Id. at 316–17.
Id. at 316 (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
World-Wide Volkswagen Co. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980).
Id. at 294 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250–251 (1958)).
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court in the forum,82 then the forum state does not go beyond the limits
of due process in asserting personal jurisdiction.83
Using World-Wide Volkswagen’s foreseeability approach, the Court
in Calder v. Jones84 held that a newspaper reporter and his editor, both
living and primarily conducting business in Florida,85 could be haled
into court in California.86 The petitioners wrote and published allegedly
defamatory material about the respondent, who resided in and earned a
living in California. The Court noted that the sources for the article
were from California,87 and the “intentional, and allegedly tortious,
actions were expressly aimed at California . . . [the defendants] knew
that the brunt of that injury would be felt by respondent in the state in
which she lives and works and in which the National Enquirer has its
largest circulation.”88 Therefore, the petitioners could “‘reasonably
anticipate being haled into court there’ to answer for the truth of the
statements made in their article.”89
The Court took into account these developments in deciding Burger
King v. Rudzewicz.90 In this case they looked at whether a contract
could constitute a sufficient contact for the purposes of due process.91 It
noted its past history of holding that a contract is “ordinarily but an
intermediate step serving to tie up prior business negotiations with
future consequences which themselves are the real object of the business
transaction.”92 Adding to the minimum contacts analysis from WorldWide Volkswagen, the Court stated that “‘it is essential in each case that
there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus
invoking the benefit and protection of its laws,’”93 and “jurisdiction is
proper . . . where the contacts proximately result from actions by the
defendant himself that create a ‘substantial connection’ with the forum
State.”94 In addition, the Court laid out a series of factors to determine
whether jurisdiction did not exceed the limits of fair play and substantial
justice, looking at:
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 297.
Id. at 297–98.
465 U.S. 783 (1984).
Id. at 785–86.
Id. at 788–89.
Id. at 788.
Id. 789–90.
Id. at 790 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Co. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).
471 U.S. 462 (1985).
Id. at 478.
Id. at 479 (citing Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313, 316–317 (1943)).
Id. at 475 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958)).
Id. (citing McGee v. Int’l Life Ins., 355 U.S. 220 (1957)).
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[T]he burden on the defendant, the forum State’s interest in adjudicating
the dispute, the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective
relief, the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most
efficient resolution of controversies, and the shared interest of the several
States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.95

Most recently, in the plurality opinion in McIntyre v. Nicastro96 the
Court shored up the Asahi97 plurality opinion, which iterated that the
minimum contacts must come “about by an action of the defendant
purposefully directed toward the forum State.”98 The McIntyre plurality
rejected the New Jersey Supreme Court’s holding that McIntyre would
have needed to take some reasonable steps to prevent its products from
ending up in New Jersey.99 The plurality declared that the stream-ofcommerce metaphor had in some situations been carried away, and that
generally, the defendant must “purposefully avail itself of the privilege
of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws” to be under the judiciary’s power,
excepting some rare situations, such as intentional torts.100 Justice
Kennedy continued, stating: “This Court’s precedents make clear that it
is the defendant’s actions, not his expectations, that empower a State’s
courts to subject him to judgment.”101
Thus we can see that the overall trend in asserting personal
jurisdiction over nonresidents has become more refined, requiring
knowledge of the empowerment of a sovereign state’s courts with
jurisdiction, in exchange for which the defendant is granted the benefits
of the laws of that state. In addition, the determination of whether or not
the assertion of personal jurisdiction through these minimum contacts
offends traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice is done by
weighing certain factors, as stated in Volkswagon.
B. Internet Jurisdiction
If there is one consensus among academic commentators on the state
of personal jurisdiction and the internet, it is that it is unsatisfactory.
The exceptionalist debate continues: ought there be a separate set of
personal specific jurisdictional rules for claims arising out of or within

95. Id. at 477 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Co. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)).
96. 131 S.Ct. 2780 (2011).
97. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
98. Id. at 112.
99. McIntyre, 131 S.Ct. at 2786 (citing Nicastro v. McIntyre, 987 A.2d 575, 579 (N.J. 2011)).
100. Id. at 2785 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
101. Id. at 2789.
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the internet? The next subpart will discuss various proposals for the best
approach to internet-based personal jurisdiction, arguing that the best is
that which looks for ways to fit the new problem into the older
framework, without bending or refuting the older rules to fit the new
problem.
1. Making the Old Fit the New
One approach is to distort the spirit of the old rules and require
internet users to restrict their activities consciously, either in a legal or
geographic manner.102 As there is technology capable of letting an
internet user restrict the geographical reach of her actions, the actor
should be responsible, or be presumptively liable, in every
jurisdiction.103 For author A. Benjamin Spencer,104 this does away with
the possible defense of ignorance in directed acts that occur over the
internet. He writes, looking at Calder: “[t]he targets of wrongdoing are
those victimized by it.”105
He continues by explaining that
“‘[j]urisdiction is about contacts with a forum . . . ’ what should be and
is relevant under Calder is that the victim was the target of the
wrongdoing and whether that victim is a resident of the forum
State . . . . Those who intentionally violate copyrights or defame others
are not targeting the State of X or the People of the State of X; rather,
they are targeting their victims.”106 Thus, the defendant will have the
burden of establishing a lack of intent to interact with anyone in the
forum state.
This theory puts a very large burden on the defendant, not just in
court, but in life. It also pushes the limits of the substantial justice and
fair play factors in Burger King. In addition, it misses the mark on how
to determine whether the defendant could reasonably anticipate being
haled into a court, by focusing on the plaintiff and not the state in which
the injury is felt. Finally, it takes into account only network-mediated
contacts. What happens when the contacts are construed as networkonly, such as between two avatars in a virtual world? The latter concern
is hopefully resolved by this Comment, and the former is dealt with by
other commentators.
102. A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction and the Internet: Returning to Traditional Principles to
Analyze Network-Mediated Contacts, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 71 (2005).
103. Id. at 75.
104. A. Benjamin Spencer is an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Richmond School
of Law. He received his J.D. from Harvard Law School in 2001. Id. at 71 n.*.
105. Id. at 102.
106. Id. (citing Robert J. Condlin, “Defendant Veto” or “Totality Of The Circumstances”? It's
Time For The Supreme Court To Straighten Out The Personal Jurisdiction Standard Once Again, 54
CATH. U. L. REV. 53, 143–44 (2004)).
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The Ninth Circuit recently held that a single eBay sale did not provide
the sufficient minimum contact necessary to provide personal
jurisdiction.107 The court “return[ed] to the original minimum contacts
test, refus[ed] to use a special test for internet contacts, and avoid[ed]
ensnarement in the technologically detailed facts . . . .”108 In this case, a
California resident bought a car from a Wisconsin resident on eBay.
The car then did not work very well, so he sued in federal district court
in California.109 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit panel held that “a contract
alone was insufficient to create minimum contacts,”110 with one
concurring judge writing that the “location of the winning bidder was a
‘fortuity’ beyond [defendant’s] control.”111 Under Spencer’s test, the
defendant in the Ninth Circuit case above would have had the
presumptive burden of disproving interactions with California, which a
sole contact and contract might have given. To iterate, Spencer’s theory
not only would have been found errant by the Ninth Circuit, but is also
biased towards network-mediated contacts. A more extreme approach,
briefly discussed below, views these latter contacts as the only type.
In Michael Traynor112 and Laura Pirri’s113 “Personal Jurisdiction and
the Internet: Emerging Trends and Future Directions,”114 the authors
argue that the contention that geographically based personal jurisdiction
does not work with the borderless internet is spurious, because the
internet architecture can be rearranged to limit jurisdictional contacts.115
In addition, they argue that the analogy of a telephone call taking place
in either the location of the calling or receiving party is appropriate for
the internet, and that the use of the term “cyberspace” has simply
created a false idea of a separate space, when everything actually
happens in real space.116 Furthermore, the authors disagree with
commentators who state that because one is often unaware of the
location of internet contacts, it would offend due process to apply
107. Personal Jurisdiction—Minimum Contacts Analysis—Ninth Circuit Holds That Single Sale
on eBay Does Not Provide Sufficient Minimum Contacts with Buyer’s State, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1014,
1014 (2009).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1014–15.
110. Id. at 1016.
111. Id.
112. Michael Traynor was the president of the American Law Institute between the years of 2002
and 2008. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=about.bio&bio_id=9
(last visited Oct. 17, 2012).
113. Laura Pirri was senior counsel for the Linden Lab and is currently legal counsel for Twitter.
LINKEDIN, http://www.linkedin.com/in/lpirri (last visited Oct. 17, 2012).
114. Michael Traynor & Laura Pirri, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Emerging Trends
and Future Directions, 712 PRACTICING L. INST. 93 (2002).
115. Id. at 121–22.
116. Id. at 124.
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personal jurisdiction based only on that contact, and go so far as to state
that the Supreme Court, in Burger King, has “retreated substantially
from a requirement of actual knowledge.”117 Their first argument—in
favor of restructuring the internet—goes down a similar path as
Spencer’s. This road seems likely to lead to a “cat to catch the mouse,
dog to catch the cat” problem, where restructuring leads to a new
approach to the internet, which itself needs restructuring to deal with
more personal jurisdiction issues.
The analogy to a telephone falls apart, in that telephones at one time
required one to call and inform the operator which state, city, or country
one wished to speak to, and then later replaced the operator with area
and country codes. This is not a sound analogy. In addition, there were
not possibly separable virtual worlds that people chose to inhabit and
connect with through the telephone system. To analogize the two is to
indicate a narrowly biased perception of the internet, and what it is
capable of. Finally, the recent McIntyre decision would seem to indicate
that actual knowledge is not only not a waning requirement, but rather is
essential to establishing personal jurisdiction.
2. Understanding How the New Fits the Old
C. Douglas Floyd118 and Shima Baradaran-Robison119 provide a more
helpful framework, basing their approach in a vague enough statement
about the internet: “The Internet is simply one means of communication,
albeit one which casts a wider, more anonymous, and less
geographically predictable sweep than more traditional means.”120 The
authors start by looking at past precedent as a way of approaching new
issues, as opposed to using new issues to argue against past precedent.
Foundationally, they look at the Supreme Court’s decisions in Burger
King and World-Wide Volkswagen, in which the Court held that the Due
Process Clause “serves the dual purpose of protecting the defendant
from inconvenient litigation, and of ensuring that the sovereign authority
of the states in relation to each other is appropriately confined.”121

117. Id. at 124–25.
118. C. Douglas Floyd was Emeritus Francis R. Kirkham Professor of Law at Brigham Young
University Law School. PILLSBURY,
http://www.pillsburylaw.com/index.cfm?pageid=15&itemid=21934 (last visited Oct. 17, 2012).
119. Shima Baradaran-Robison is an associate professor at Brigham Young University Law
School. LINKEDIN, http://www.linkedin.com/pub/shima-baradaran-robison/5/a65/466 (last visited Oct.
17, 2012).
120. C. Douglas Floyd & Shima Baradaran-Robison, Towards a Unified Test of Personal
Jurisdiction in an Era of Widely Diffused Wrongs: The Relevance of Purpose and Effects, 81 IND. L.J.
601, 628 (2006).
121. Id.
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With this as background, Floyd and Baradaran-Robison propose a test
in which “the Court . . . adopt[s] a unified approach to personal
jurisdiction analysis which turns primarily on whether the defendant
objectively should be held on notice that his conduct was substantially
certain to have the impact claimed by the plaintiff to be wrongful in the
forum state.”122 They argue that while the development of a personal
jurisdiction test for widespread informational wrongs and intangible
injuries is not easy, their approach eliminates the issue of intent or
purpose, and instead focuses on the reasonable expectation of being
haled into court in a forum state.123
This approach is not far off of Brian D. Boone’s, in “Bullseye!: Why
a ‘Targeting’ Approach to Personal Jurisdiction in the E-commerce
Context Makes Sense Internationally.”124 Boone starts out differently,
with the presumption that “[t]he Internet is ‘not merely multijurisdictional, it is almost a-jurisdictional. The hardware and software
structure of the internet is designed to ignore rather than acknowledge
geographic location. For purposes of jurisdiction, there is ‘simply no
coherent homology between cyberspace and real space.”125 The best
approach to personal jurisdiction, especially within the context of ecommerce, is thus a “targeting approach,” which would remove “much
of the uncertainty that accompanies the usually-applied soft ‘effects’
approach.”126 The result, Boone claims, is a return to O’Connor’s
plurality opinion in Asahi.127 He gives as an example the case of Rio
Properties, Inc. v. Rio International Interlink,128 a trademark
infringement case. The defendant’s Costa Rican passive website
through which the alleged infringement took place was not sufficient to
provide jurisdiction; instead, personal jurisdiction was established by the
defendant’s radio and print advertising in the forum state.129 Boone
claims that by using the concept of “targeting,” the concepts ‘purposeful
availment’ and ‘stream of commerce’ are refined in an Internet targeting
analysis, not redefined.”130
What is peculiar about Boone’s argument is that his claimed result, a

122. Id. at 666.
123. Id.
124. Brian D. Boone, Bullseye!: Why a “Targeting” Approach to Personal Jurisdiction in the ECommerce Context Makes Sense Internationally, 20 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 241 (2006).
125. Id. at 246 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Dan L. Burk, Jurisdiction in a World
Without Borders, 1 VA. J. L & TECH. 3, 17 (1997)).
126. Id. at 266.
127. Id.
128. 284 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002).
129. Boone, supra note 124, at 268 (citing Rio Props. Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007,
1020 (9th Cir. 2002)).
130. Id. at 266.
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return to O’Connor’s plurality opinion, is what the Supreme Court
seems to want in McIntyre. The idea of targeting also encompasses the
virtues of Floyd and Baradaran-Robison’s proposal, in that the targeting
seems to not require a purpose or intent to cause harm, but more of an
intent to connect with a forum state. It is, in effect, an intent to
purposely avail oneself of what the forum state has to offer.
These last two approaches, and particularly the latter, emphasize what
is missing in the earlier proposals: a connection with the forum. An
attempt to gain jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant on the basis of
wronging an in-state resident, especially in the age of the internet, is too
attenuated, as the act or omission causing the injury may be completely
disconnected from the forum state. The Boone and Floyd/BaradaranRobison approaches would seem to be better in terms of following
precedent and not offending due process or overly burdening the
defendant.
What is important is that the approach try to fit the Supreme Court’s
analysis post-McIntyre, and not the other way around. A targeting or
knowledge of directed effects test is the best. However, the emphasis on
the act or omission’s connection with the forum state becomes
problematic when virtual worlds are introduced. One way of reducing
this problem is to analogize the avatar/user unity to a relationship.
However, even when such a relationship is assumed, this model may be
deficient in providing personal jurisdiction. One way to mitigate this is
by use of EULA or TOS agreements.
C. EULA/TOS Agreements
In 2007, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied a motion to
compel arbitration131 because it found that the arbitration clause written
into the TOS of Second Life was unconscionable, and that “the
arbitration clause is not designed to provide Second Life participants an
effective means of resolving disputes with Linden.132 Since then,
Second Life has changed its TOS,133 and any non-injunctive or equitable
relief claim for less than ten thousand dollars is subject to binding nonappearance based arbitration if either party chooses such.134 In addition,
any non-arbitrated dispute is subject to California law and venue, except
for suits for equitable or injunctive relief to protect intellectual property,
which may be filed wherever the owner resides or has its principal place
131. Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F.Supp.2d 593, 605–14 (E.D. Penn. 2007).
132. Id. at 611.
133. DURANSKE, supra note 7, at 31.
134. SECOND LIFE TERMS OF SERVICE, http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php at 12.1 (last visited
Oct. 17, 2012).
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of business.135
Generally, the software and certain rights are licensed to the user in
the EULA/TOS.136 The EULA and TOS are, for the purposes of this
Comment, effectively the same because for both the user must agree to
the provider’s demands in order to access and use the system, and both
give significant decision making power to the provider.137 In addition,
platform providers often give themselves the power to proscribe certain
behavior, such as racist or other offensive statements or conduct,
between or among avatars.138
The most recent Second Life TOS indicates that Second Life owner
Linden Labs feels it is legally capable of determining the choice of law
and venue for some suits against itself, excepting equity and injunctive
claims. These are suits against Linden itself, but it could be possible to
extend this to suits by and against any avatar/user by virtue of the
claimed injury taking place entirely within the virtual world provided by
Linden. This is admittedly a broad proposition, but not unreasonable.
There exists the concern about extending the scope of these
agreements to conflicts between private parties, and not to those
between the virtual world provider and inhabitant. However, these types
of agreements already exist and have force behind them. The Uniform
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP)139 is put forth by the
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Number (ICANN).140
The UDRP states that anyone who registers a domain name within
certain top level domains (such as .com, .net, and .org) is bound by the
Registration Agreement, which sets forth “the terms and conditions in
connection with a dispute between [the registrant] and any party other
than [the registrar].”141 For example, Section 4 of the UDRP requires a
mandatory administration proceeding when one party complains that
another party is violating her trademark rights.142 Once the mandatory
administrative proceeding has commenced or concluded, the party or

135. Id. at 12.2. Generally EULA/TOS choice of law provisions provide for the law of the state in
which the server company has its headquarters. Choice of law is less straightforward, and varies by
global location of the user. See generally DURANKSE, supra note 7, at 30–31.
136. Allen Chein, A Practical Look at Virtual Property, 80 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1059, 1084 (2006).
137. Jennifer Gong, Defining and Addressing Virtual Property in International Treaties, 17 B.U.
J. SCI. & TECH. L. 101, 113 n.82 (2011).
138. DURANSKE, supra note 7, at 129.
139. Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”), INTERNET
CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS, http://www.icann.org/en/dndr/udrp/uniformrules.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2012).
140. Id.
141. Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED
NAMES AND NUMBERS, http://www.icann.org/en/dndr/udrp/policy.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2012).
142. Id. at Section 4.
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parties may submit the dispute to a court.143 Thus, an offline defendant
would be bound to act in accordance with the TOS, but could, once the
suit is commenced, challenge the plaintiff’s complaint in another court,
if that court had proper jurisdiction.
D. Personal Jurisdiction in Virtual Worlds
Two presumptions have been made in the discussion of personal
jurisdiction in virtual worlds. The first is that the virtual world exists
distinctly from the real world, and so the borders establishing
sovereignty within the United States are not etched onto the virtual
world. The second is that the user/avatar unity is best analogized to that
of a sole proprietorship.
Generally
unincorporated
associations
(including
sole
proprietorships) do not have a state citizenship of their own.144 In
addition, suing an unincorporated association can be done by the
recognition of it as a jural entity, by a court, state, or federal statute.145
A sole proprietorship, in which the business and the person are one,
would be subject to jurisdiction wherever the person is a citizen, and
wherever the person does enough business to create minimum contacts.
Thus, to start out, the user of an avatar would be subject to
jurisdiction for any actionable virtual world injuries through acts or
omissions in the state in which she has citizenship. If user/avatar (U/A
1), a citizen and resident of Ohio, injures in the virtual world user/avatar
2 (U/A 2), a citizen and resident of Idaho, U/A 2 should be able to go to
Ohio and bring a lawsuit against U/A 1.146 That one U/A actionably
injured by another U/A should be able to bring a suit against that U/A
should not be denied. The simplest way to bring a suit would be to go to
the home state of the injuring U/A. But if U/A 2 in Idaho wishes to
make U/A 1 in Ohio leave Ohio and come to Idaho or a more convenient
state for U/A 2, then personal jurisdiction becomes a problem. The
injury took place in the virtual world, which is disjointed from the real
world and does not reflect state sovereign jurisdictions. It would be
unfair to presume that any interaction in a virtual world is subject to
every jurisdiction.147 It would be equally unfair to shield a U/A from
143. Id. at Section 4(k). Of note here is that the policy indicates that the dispute may be submitted
to a court of “competent jurisdiction.” Id. One could argue that analogizing to a system that itself does
not give jurisdiction detracts from the analysis. However, the emphasis of the analysis is on the TOS
that mandate procedures for private party disputes.
144. 32 AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 1177 (2011).
145. Charles Alan Wright et al., 7 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1861 (3d ed. 2012).
146. This is assuming that the identity of the injuring user is discovered by the injured user. In
some situations this will be easier than others. See generally DURANSKE, supra note 7, at 165–75.
147. Here, only state jurisdiction is discussed. The international issues of jurisdiction are equally
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every state jurisdiction but her own. It is also overly exceptionalist to
demand a specific virtual jurisdiction because of the unity of the user
and avatar. The injuries upon the avatar are assumed to have been in
one way or another visited upon the user, in addition to having another
user as original provenance. Therefore, some sort of fair, real world
jurisdiction system is required.
The Supreme Court’s attempt to eliminate the Brennan concurrence148
in Asahi and focus on directed acts in the recent McIntyre case is a good
guide. Simply dropping a product into the stream of commerce, or the
virtual equivalent of interacting without directed injurious acts, should
not be sufficient to allow the state in which the accidentally injured
avatar/user is found. This seems appropriate, and in conformity with
Asahi, World-Wide Volkswagen, and McIntyre. On the other end of the
spectrum, one U/A directly injuring another U/A, which seemingly
would fall under the spectrum of Calder, is problematic. Using the idea
of directing at or targeting a jurisdiction through directing at or targeting
an entity within that jurisdiction being sufficient notice to the entity
doing the targeting, the question is whether the U/A targeting another
U/A, presumably in another jurisdiction, should be on notice that she is
subject to jurisdiction in either any state or in a previously specified
state. This previously specified state could be incorporated into the
EULA or TOS, along with choice of forum and arbitration clauses. Or,
if it were reasonably facile to determine the jurisdictional state of the
targeted entity, such as by a simple web finding of identical names and
products in the real and virtual world, the injuring U/A might be
considered on notice to be bound by the jurisdiction-granting state of the
injured U/A.
Using a predetermined forum (agreed upon in the EULA or TOS)
would permit any user/avatar to know where she could be haled into
court, regardless of residence of the alleged victim. For example, the
consistent knowing use of the Linden Server, and the continuous contact
with the server necessary to maintain a Second Life existence, satisfy
the minimum contacts test in California, if that were the state forum for
such dispute resolution laid out in the EULA/TOS. The four factor test
laid out in Burger King to determine substantial justice and fair play
would also be taken into account. The burden on the defendant would
be lower, based on the defendant’s prior knowledge that she might be
haled into the predetermined forum, and the convenient and effective
relief for the plaintiff would be provided by a court system well-versed
problematic, but beyond the scope of this comment.
148. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 117 (1987) (finding that
“jurisdiction premised on the placement of a product into the stream of commerce is consistent with the
Due Process Clause” and requires no further contacts).
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in virtual world injuries in a forum the plaintiff knows the defendant
must accede to. The resolution of interstate controversies would be
made more efficient by the prior knowledge of a given state in which the
controversies would be disputed. Finally, the substantive social policies
(read here as policies affecting parts of society) regarding virtual world
offenses having effect in the non-virtual world of the several states
would be addressed by the establishment of a defined jurisdiction for
suits arising out of virtual world injuries.
V. APPLICATION
A recent survey of online gamers found that they spent an average of
over twenty hours a week in the virtual world, and that the experiences
that most affected them, both positively and negatively, were online.149
In his article on crime and the online persona, Reed proposes four
categories of attacks on online persona that would make criminalization
of the conduct justified: (1) attacks likely to cause distress to the user,
(2) attacks likely to damage the online reputation of the avatar, (3)
attacks limiting the connectivity between user and avatar, and (4) attacks
pushing avatars out of social spaces and limiting their free speech.150 It
is important to note that none of these encompasses actual physical
injury to the avatar—because while the virtual world is separable, many
physical aspects of the real world do not transfer. However, crimes that
are physical in nature in the real world would, if committed by one U/A
against another, can fall into the “causing distress” category. Rape,
assault, battery, or theft of what would be considered the avatar’s
belongings would all lead to distress of the user. In addition, depending
on the severity of the distress, the injury might result in a disconnect
between the user and avatar. The other two of Reed’s categories go
more towards defamation and harassment.
Reed discusses the ability to report to customer service concerns that
one has in Second Life. In response to complaints, Second Life makes a
decision and then can choose to do anything, from taking no action to
terminating a user’s account.151 The user has agreed to be bound by this
in the EULA, and in fact could probably not do otherwise. As Reed puts
it, “owned online spaces operate very much under a sovereign form of
governance, in which the owner as world God enforces its will for its
own ends. Redress against attacks on an online persona depends
entirely on whether [it] . . . advances the interests of the world
149. Chris Reed, Why Must You Be Mean to Me? Crime and the Online Persona, 13 NEW CRIM.
L. REV. 485, 487 (2010).
150. Id. at 493–94.
151. Id. at 497.
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owner.”152 This not only effectively disables the U/A’s access to real
world justice, but also very much reduces the U/A to a lower-class of
citizen than the user on her own. Reed argues for an approach that
would criminalize certain actions in virtual worlds, with suits brought in
the real world.153 In addition, his proposal to focus on the behavior and
not the victim154 could be seen as a first step towards the law truly
extending its reach into the virtual world.
A. Rape
While there has been widespread discussion on whether rape is
possible in Second Life,155 if it is assumed that it is possible, clearly a
crime has been committed by one or more U/A’s against another U/A.
And, while the physical injury that results in the real world is not present
in the virtual world, the emotional trauma can be.156 Thus, if this
conduct were criminalized, even under a less severe criminal harassment
statute instead of a sex crime statute,157 it would still be actionable in the
real world. But where could the victim bring suit?
In this case, the U/A rapist targeting another U/A is probably not
considering the victim user’s home state. While the crime is terrible, it
would not be fair to say that just because the crime is more offensive,
the standard for determining personal jurisdiction can be lowered. In
this case, the two options can be put to use. In the first, in which the
U/A attacker knew or should have known that the U/A victim was
connected to a known state (through the identity of the U/A), the attack
could be considered as an attack against that state, in so much as the
laws of that state permitted the victim to self-integrate into the virtual
world significantly. In the second, the attacker was specifically taking
advantage of the virtual aspects of the world, and so should be subject to
wherever the EULA or TOS specify. In this way, the victim U/A is not
without remedy, and the attacker U/A is not unfairly subject to the
jurisdiction of every state.
B. Breach of Contract
In Second Life, one way of developing one’s avatar is by scripting

152. Id. at 498.
153. Id. at 505.
154. Id. at 512.
155. See, e.g., id. at 504; DURANKSE, supra note 7.
156. Susan W. Brenner, Fantasy Crime: The Role of Criminal Law in Virtual Worlds, 11 VAND. J.
ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 77 (2008).
157. Id. at 79.
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new facial features, body parts, or clothing. Or, the avatar can pay
Linden Dollars to another avatar who has already scripted these. If the
product turns out to be defective or to not work as promised, might the
buying avatar sue for breach of contract? If so, which state’s law
controls? Should the seller be liable in every state? It would seem to
violate “fair play and substantial justice” to say that someone who
scripts and sells a few virtual Hawaiian shirts per month has the
requisite minimum contacts to be under the jurisdiction of every state.
In addition to establishing the relationship between the user and
platform provider, many EULA’s and TOS’s also have sections
governing the relationship between and among user/avatars, prohibiting
various conduct, such as racially or personally offensive acts, and even
regulating in-world transfer of property.158 These tend to give the
platform provider the ability to banish a user, but at its discretion, and
only if it wishes to.159 The user-avatar seeking to enforce a contract has
no established remedy or forum to obtain justice.
Under the directed or intentioned action approach to personal
jurisdiction, the seller would not be subject to personal jurisdiction in
the buyer’s state unless the buyer could prove that the seller knew or
should have known her resident state. However, the seller would be
subject to personal jurisdiction in his or her own state of residence, or in
a previously agreed-upon forum state, such as California. This state
would change, dependent on the EULA or TOS of the virtual world.
C. Defamation
As virtual worlds develop into non-identical reflections of the nonvirtual world, communities form within them. It is this notion of
community that makes defamation injuries likely causes of action in
virtual worlds.160 If defamation is determined by the context of
community, the victim’s work and living location, the source of
publication, and audience of the defamation,161 then virtual world
defamation will be problematic insofar as determining whether it was

158. DURANSKE, supra note 7, at 129–30.
159. Id. at 130. Duranske develops the nuance that the provider has the right to banish for
offensiveness, but not the duty to maintain a world free of offense. For example, if the offensive user
provided a not-insignificant portion of the provider’s profits, it might choose to not banish the offensive
user/avatar.
160. This is in the situation where the avatar and user are not so closely linked as to produce the
assumption that any attack on the avatar is an attack on the user’s real-world identity. See generally id.
at 182–85. In such a situation, it is likely Calder would generally apply, though the issue of where the
injury was felt would still be problematic.
161. See, e.g., Amy Kristin Sanders, Defining Defamation: Community in the Age of the Internet,
15 COM. L. & POL’Y 231, 257 (2010).
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the avatar or user who felt the injury, where each “lived” or “worked,”
and whose reputation was injured. In the situation of one avatar
defaming another, allowing a plaintiff to “plead and prove relevant
community . . . may provide the only real opportunity to recover for
injury to reputation.”162 Claiming that the injury was felt in the virtual
world, or even more specifically, the virtual community in which the
defamed avatar existed, permits a valid defamation claim triable in real
world courts.
Because defamation is a directed act, the burden of proving that the
defamer knew or should have known the resident state of the defamed
U/A might require fewer contacts, but would still be on the plaintiff.
Absent this proof, the plaintiff would have the option of finding the
U/A’s resident state to sue there, or in a previously designated forum
state.
VI. CONCLUSION
The development of virtual worlds and the possibility of solely virtual
world injuries has led to certain concerns, among them acquiring
personal jurisdiction over the alleged injurer. As rules on the internet
tend to be best followed when those who would fall under their scope
recognize and knowingly accept these rules, determining the rules for
personal jurisdiction for injuries which occur completely inside the
virtual world before, and making these rules part of the EULA/ TOS is
the best way to ensure compliance. That these rules can fit into our
already existing rules for personal jurisdiction will ensure that applying
personal jurisdiction to plaintiffs in virtual world injuries will not
encroach upon a state’s sovereignty, or defy standards of substantial
justice and fair play.

162. Id. at 262–63.
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